Muskan Dhawan
Introduction
Amid simmering tensions between India and China, New Delhi has found new immediacy in opposing China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the vital Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In the past few years, these island nations have become important battlegrounds for powerful countries to sway geopolitical events to their advantage. Beijing’s consistently increasing economic and military influence in the region presents the Indian strategic community with the difficult task of protecting its maritime backyard and regional interests. In an attempt to counter China’s influence, India has given Sri Lanka more than $4 billion in aid in 2024 as it struggles with a severe financial and economic crisis. The situation with the Maldives, however, has changed significantly, demonstrating a lack of diplomatic finesse from the Indian side and a more heavy-handed approach towards the Maldives’ behavior. Despite the current Maldivian government’s insistence on an “India-free Maldives,” India has allocated funds for the Maldives in this year’s budget, underscoring the complexities of the geopolitical dynamics in the region.
Source: PicElysium, https://pixabay.com/photos/one-belt-and-one-road-6098029/
India’s intensified diplomatic drive, combining targeted development assistance and security partnerships, represents a crucial prong in its China strategy. While avoiding confrontation, New Delhi aims to push back Beijing’s ambitions and retain regional primacy amidst a turbulent political economy backdrop across South Asia. As great powers contend for leverage, Sri Lanka and Maldives have become tell-tale signs of whether India can preserve its strategic backyard. [1]
China’s influence in Sri Lanka and Maldives through BRI project
In 2013, China launched an ambitious infrastructure development initiative called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to establish land and maritime trade routes connecting Asia with Africa and Europe. Through this initiative, China aims to strengthen economic ties with developing nations by funding and constructing roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects. From Sri Lanka to Djibouti to Greece, the BRI has financed large-scale infrastructure projects, enabling China to gain strategic access and influence in these regions through its construction capabilities. While countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives have benefited from improved infrastructure and trade facilitation, the opaque financing terms have also trapped them in debt and political dependencies. As the BRI expands its reach across the Indian Ocean region, it has become a powerful geopolitical tool for China, posing a challenge to established powers like India through focused infrastructure diplomacy. [2]
China has gained unprecedented economic stakes and strategic footholds in the debt-ridden nation of Sri Lanka through projects such as the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City. In 2022, a Chinese research vessel docked at Hambantota Port, despite India’s concerns. The Maldives, on the other hand, has become increasingly reliant on China for trade, with its dependency nearing 50%. Concerns have been raised about the potential dual-use of infrastructure projects like the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge and the proposed 25-island cooperative development for military purposes by the Chinese Navy. This year, while Sri Lanka is scheduled to join China’s Global Security Initiative, the Maldives has already signed onto it, marking a symbolic setback for India’s influence in the region. [3]
These advancements by China pose a severe threat to India, as China is establishing key entry points in what New Delhi considers its strategic backyard. Compounding the challenge is the ongoing border tensions between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Countering China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region will be a crucial task for the Modi administration, as the BRI is expected to continue shaping regional dynamics.[4]
India’s Strategic Diplomacy in Sri Lanka and Maldives
India has advanced certain national security goals through its increased strategic diplomacy with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 2022–2023. Deeper interoperability between regional navies, expanded radar systems, and coastline surveillance procedures with the Maldives have improved domain awareness in southern waters. However, the status of important energy project agreements with the Maldives, concluded in 2023, remains uncertain due to the strained relations. Collaborative naval exercises centered on anti-submarine warfare and aviation operations also indicate a mutual awareness of possible hazards. The process of integration is also aided by plans to connect infrastructure to ports in India. These particular deliverables have enabled India to be more resilient to hostile unilateral actions in its maritime backyard, but striking a balance between development assistance and strategic alignment is constantly challenging.
Sri Lanka: Strengthening Bilateral Ties and Infrastructure Projects
Faced with escalating Chinese incursions, India has stepped up attempts to pull Sri Lanka out of Beijing’s circle. In 2022, as Sri Lanka’s economy plunged into catastrophe, India offered over $3.8 billion in urgent help for food, fuel, and medical supplies. This year, India extended an additional $1.4 billion credit line for Sri Lankan imports and is working with the Asian Development Bank to rehabilitate the Colombo Port. Plans are also being proposed to restore the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farms. Beyond crisis mitigation, New Delhi hopes to strengthen cultural links and improve skill-building initiatives that empower Sri Lankan youth in fields such as information technology.
These initiatives demonstrate India’s skills as a trusted partner capable of balancing immediate economic needs and long-term capacity development. They are also strategically focused, with an emphasis on ports and infrastructure projects commonly associated with China’s objectives. As Sri Lanka seeks economic independence, India has positioned itself as an alternative to BRI’s debt pitfalls. This blends immediate relief with the promise of self-reliance, emphasizing friendship’s ability to provide holistic advantages. [5]
Maldives: A Momentary Lapse or Paradigm shift?
In an effort to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean area, India gave a naval attack vessel to the Maldives National Defense Force last year. There were also plans to increase coastal surveillance and radar coverage. In terms of finances, a $500 million infrastructure program for Greater Male Connectivity was authorized in 2020 by New Delhi. India also inked a contract this year for a road development project funded by India. In contrast to frequently ambiguous BRI agreements, these aids demonstrated India’s dependability as a development partner for the Maldives.
However, the relationship between India and the Maldives has been strained recently, with the Muizzu government taking actions that suggest a shift towards China. President Muizzu’s anti-India rhetoric has only been emboldened with time. Despite appealing to Prime Minister Narendra Modi in late December to expedite the completion of the $500 million Thilamalé Bridge project, which will link Malé with other key islands by 2025, the Maldives has requested India to remove stationed military personnel. The new administration has also expressed a desire to invite more Chinese visitors, indicative of a potential rift in their bilateral ties. The Maldives has also been vocal about raising an issue with India’s plans to develop infrastructure and expand military facilities at the Lakshadweep Islands, an Indian union territory located close to the Maldives. It perceives these developments as a potential threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On January 13, 2024, Muizzu made a thinly veiled reference to India, stating, “We may be small, but won’t be bullied,” and asserting that the “Indian Ocean is not in anyone’s backyard.”
The Maldives owed approximately $400.9 million to India by the end of last year. During the previous pro-India administration led by Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, the total loans taken from the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) amounted to $322 million, bringing the total debt owed to India to $462 million by the end of the year. India has been providing humanitarian aid and medical evacuation services to the Maldives using helicopters and Dornier aircraft. Notably, India has proposed cutting aid to the Maldives by 22% for the 2024-2025 financial year, according to the interim budget document released by the Indian government.
These developments are concerning for India, as they suggest the Maldives may be drifting closer into China’s orbit due to the latter’s economic influence and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. They could potentially open the door for greater Chinese interference and influence in the Maldives’ domestic affairs as seen over the years in fellow smaller islands. Amid these geopolitical challenges, finding common ground and resolving issues bilaterally is essential to prevent the Maldives from drifting further towards China. As Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe recently stated, India and the Maldives are expected to “resolve issues bilaterally”(6). Consequently, New Delhi has to engage in proactive diplomacy with Malé to rebuild productive paths that are in line with both countries’ interests for a secure Indian Ocean region, while also addressing the Maldives’ concerns and maintaining a balance in their relations.
Future Prospects for India’s Strategic Diplomacy in South Asia
In the past two to three years, India has used strategic diplomacy in South Asia to highlight both significant progress and formidable challenges in its efforts to curb China’s expansive influence along the Belt and Road in the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi has achieved real progress in strengthening partnerships and achieving strategic goals such as improving maritime domain awareness by combining infrastructure investment, security cooperation, and crisis relief aid. By positioning itself as a dependable development partner offering holistic benefits without opaque debt traps, India has provided alternatives that allow countries to retain strategic autonomy. Regional alignments like the Quad and IPEF also give India a supportive framework for countering certain BRI practices.
India has aggressively strengthened regional ties since 2020 after realizing there is strength in numbers against the BRI. To coordinate infrastructural capacity building, vaccination diplomacy, and the monitoring of illicit fishing in the Indo-Pacific, the US, Japan, and Australia resurrected the Quad. Reported discussions between Indian, Taiwanese, and US security officials in 2022, in particular, suggested that the Quad countries and technologically advanced democracies like Taiwan, which are opposing Chinese coercive coercion, have similar goals. The India-Japan Act East Forum is focused on bilateral projects related to ASEAN connectivity, whereas the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement seeks to enhance supply chain diversification. To increase the number of its partners in the Indian Ocean, India has also strengthened its security alliances with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and France. India pledged to tighten economic cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific region and joined the US-led IPEF at the beginning of 2023.
These multilateral structures are still developing, but they show an increasing agreement to offer complementary options to the BRI’s untransparent practices. Additionally, they give India the critical strategic breathing room it needs to counter China’s growing regional influence both on land and at sea. [7] To eliminate the potential for Chinese exploitation, trade, and travel connections must be promptly restored. India should combine practical steps to boost confidence that are based on open communication with ongoing development assistance going forward. Disparities that are beginning to emerge can be bridged by being open to finding some common ground and reaffirming support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Maldives. More fruitful results may also be achieved by moving some disputes to cooperative working groups for organized talks. Like in every relationship, new paradigms can be paved by identifying important concerns rather than just taking strong views.
Maintaining strategic outcomes will depend on how well India handles impending risks. Repayment commitments and political maneuverability will test India’s crisis management. Events outside our control will put this resilience to the test. India needs to get ready for China to pretend to be the hero and present itself as an alternative to the debt recovery process that is being driven by the West. Overcoming Big Brother allegations about Indian initiatives presents another tightrope for Indian diplomacy, even as alliances with the US and Europe offer policy options for the BRI. Utilizing local collaborations effectively is essential to advancing ideas of sustainable development.
The issue for India is to maintain its status as a chosen substantive partner capable of ensuring that geopolitical realignments are in line with a regional order based on rules. Regularized working groups, collaborative maritime patrols, and commitments to sustainability could all steadily reinforce a rules-based regional order.
As future risks test India’s diplomatic finesse, a focus on pragmatically advancing overlapping interests should guide its agenda. Though significant obstacles remain, India’s recent progress shows that disciplined investment in partnerships reaffirming sovereignty could dampen the allure of China’s coercive infrastructure tactics over time.
Muskan Dhawan is a researcher with a Bachelor’s degree in English Honours and a Post-Graduate degree in Defence and Strategic Studies. She had the opportunity to serve as a Visiting Researcher at the National Chung Hsing University in Taiwan under the prestigious Taiwan Experience Education Program (TEEP)
References
1. Matoo, A. (2022). Early in 2022 and into 2023, Sri Lanka and the Maldives became important battlegrounds where two powerful Asian nations made deliberate measures to sway geopolitical events to their advantage. International Affairs – Academically rigorous and policy relevant research for 100 years, 98(5).
2. Zhou, W., & Esteban, M. (2020). China’s New Global Strategy: China’s approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative.
3. Mallempati, S. (n.d.). BRI in Sri Lanka and Maldives: Economic, Political and Security Dynamics. In S. Kumar, China’s BRI in Different Regions of the World: Cooperation, Contradictions and Concerns.
4. Kumari, R. (2022, March). INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI): REJECTION AND COMPETITION. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Educational Research, 11(3), 6.
5. Loc, T. M. (2023). India’s Regional Security and Defense Cooperation: A Study of Sino-Indian Rivalry In Sri Lanka. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 6(1), 31-45.
6. Wickremesinghe, R. (2024, February). Sri Lanka President Ranil Wickremesinghe speaks to WION on Chinese vessels, UPI and more. (S. Sibal, Interviewer)
7. Yoshimatsu, H. (2022, December). India’s Response to China’s Geoeconomic Rise: Hedging With a Multipronged Engagement. Australian Journal of Politics & History, 68(4), 593-611.
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